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1 The central thesis of this book is that beginning in 1996 China put in place a grand
strategy designed to create an environment that would be favourable for its economic
development and to reduce the risks of a backlash to its rise as an economic, diplomatic
and military power. In fact, many changes set out by Avery Goldstein—particularly the
maintaining of very close and, in the end, relatively stable working relations with the
United States—are testimony to the solid foundation of his analysis. However, this book
also raises quite a few questions, both about the precise date of this new strategy and
the nature of the changes observed in Beijing’s foreign and security policy as a result.
2 The author’s demonstration is in many respects convincing. It is true that 1996 was the
climax  of  Sino-American  tension  over  Taiwan  and  more  broadly  of  the  difficulties
between China and the West in the post-Tiananmen period, and the beginning of a new
approach by Beijing to its relations with the outside world. In its realisation that the
world was going to remain dominated, at least militarily, by a single superpower—the
United States—for a long time to come, and would consequently evolve towards multi-
polarity more slowly than it had hoped initially, that is, after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, China decided to open up more markedly to multilateralism and to establish
with the other major countries (Russia, France, United States) or groupings of States
(European Union, ASEAN) special partnership relations.
3 It  is  abundantly  clear  that  the  growth  of  military  pressures  on  Taiwan,  the  many
gesticulations and shows of military muscle by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in
the South China Sea  and the  acceleration in  the  modernisation of  Chinese  defence
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system,—all  of  which  was  supported  by a  rhetoric  that  was  at  once  anti-Western,
nationalist and irredentist—could but favour the rise of the “Chinese threat” syndrome,
not only in Japan but also in the United States, South-East Asia and to a certain extent
Europe. As Goldstein well shows, the tightening of strategic links between Washington
and its main allies in the Asia-Pacific region (Tokyo and Canberra in particular) has
been one of  the  most  direct  factors  in  the  “realignment”  of  Beijing’s  international
policy.
4 Why 1996? For the author, the year of the “missile crisis” is also that—inferred—of a
reassessment by the Chinese Communist Party of its external strategy. In support of
this thesis,  Goldstein refers to a number of diplomatic initiatives taken by China in
1996.  Among  them  he  cites  the  setting  up  by  China,  Russia  and  three  newly
independent  Central  Asian  republics  of  the  “Shanghai  group”,  the  first  regional
multilateral structure that Beijing not only joined but to which it also gave an impetus,
transforming  it  in  2001  into  the  Shanghai  Organisation  for  Co-operation.  He  also
discusses a strategic partnership with Russia put in place by China in April 1996, and its
intention, which it made public in August of the same year, to sign the Comprehensive
Nuclear  Test  Ban  Treaty  and  its  openness  to  multilateral  discussions  with  ASEAN,
particularly concerning the disputed islands in the South China Sea. Mention is also
made of Beijing’s attitude, at the time of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, which met
with regional approval.
5 Yet, in spite of all this, we may wonder whether this was a real turning point. Everyone
agrees that China’s global strategy has evolved since Tiananmen, and a fortiori since
1979 and the start of the reform process. Moreover, through the study of many source
documents, analyses by Chinese researchers and interviews conducted in China, Japan
and the United States between 1998 and 2003, Goldstein sheds light on a whole set of
gradual but profound transformations in Beijing’s policy.  These changes underscore
both the Chinese Communist Party’s capacity to react and adapt and to initiate a slow
but apparently irreversible process of integration into the international community,
marked, for example, by China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in
2001.  The difficulty in analysis  comes from the fact  that the actor “China” has not
stopped  pursuing  two  fundamental  objectives:  1)  modernise  the  country  without
jeopardising the one-party political  system in place today;  2)  restore its  status as a
major power on the international stage. While these two priorities do lead the writer to
discuss the relevance, and limits, of China’s Bismarkian tendencies today, they do not
lead him to conclude that the country is a “revisionist power” as opposed to being a
supporter of the status quo, judging this to be an over-simplified debate.
6 In fact, it is. Nonetheless, how can an economy which is developing at the pace and to
the  extent  it  is  in  inter-dependence  with  the  outside  world  remain  a  power  that
contributes to the status quo (although it is often officially in favour of it)? We see this
every day — in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as in international organisations—
as the rise of China directly contributes to changing the rules of play and forces the
other powers to adjust their own strategy.
7 Furthermore, can we say that the “diplomacy of partnerships” heralds a more clear-cut
opening up by the Chinese government to regimes that are politically different? This is
far from being certain. On the contrary, these partnerships were set up by Beijing first
and foremost in the hope of neutralising any direct criticism of its domestic system and
of channelling any such criticism into “non-confrontational” dialogues which would
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allow it to impose both its own view of international relations and its own strategy. It is
not surprising therefore that China has experienced some difficulties in establishing
such  a  partnership  with  the  United  States  (once  the  Clinton  era  had  passed,  this
partnership, albeit still “under construction”, was buried).
8 Finally, this idea of partnerships was put forward by the Chinese government with the
aim of finally moving beyond the isolation of the post-Tiananmen period. While they
may well have got underway in 1996, they came about under the auspices of diplomatic
efforts at reintegration into the international community, which began, multilaterally,
with China’s  active  participation in  the UNO negotiations in  Paris  on the future of
Cambodia (1990). Beijing’s signing up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1992) or on the
contrary the tensions in 1999 (the stalled Sino-American negotiations over the WTO,
the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, anti-American demonstrations, Lee
Teng-hui’s two-state theory) show that this process of integration is a slow and rocky
one.
9 If  there was one identifiable turning-point, it  seems to me to have come out of the
domestic policy debate during the winter of 1999-2000. Indeed, this debate (to which
Goldstein refers, p. 155) led to a change both in Beijing’s international policy and in its
discourse. The failure of China’s Taiwan policy (the election of Chen Shui-bian) and the
arrival in power of an American president ill-disposed towards it have confirmed this
development. We had to wait until this period for the Chinese government to really
abandon  a  defensive  and  adversarial  posture  and  to  prefer  instead  a  policy  of
participation and negotiation. Its denunciation of “hegemonism” disappeared from the
Communist  Party’s  charter;  its  criticisms of  the American alliances in Asia  and the
enlargement of NATO gradually toned down; in place of its policy of accelerating the
process of unification was substituted a strategy which made maintaining the status
quo in the Taiwan Strait a priority; and above all the great change in its foreign policy
style and discourse, henceforth promoting “win-win” solutions and taking a pro-active
approach in international fora. It was, moreover, in this context that the short-lived
debate over “the peaceful emergence of China” appeared in 2003-2004.
10 It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  these  changes  are  strategic  or  tactical  in  nature.
Goldstein suggests that they have an important strategic component, adapting China to
the  international  environment  of  the  post-Cold  War  era.  There  has  been  some
adaptation and it would be wrong to underestimate this capacity and talent of the part
of the Chinese government. However, the major choices were already made back in
1979. While they were adjusted after 1989, particularly in 1992 with the relaunching of
reforms, the dual objectives referred to above remain intact.
11 Lastly, Goldstein refers little to the internal-external nexus and the multiple economic,
demographic and environmental  constraints impinging on the Chinese government.
Furthermore,  these  constraints  can  only  take  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  even
further from the Bismarkian model, as the challenges to Beijing’s international strategy
could well come not from abroad, in particular the United States or Japan, but from
within. In other terms, while the Chinese Communist Party has shown an exceptional
capacity to adapt to the post-Communist world, it is not certain that it will be able to
keep as successfully its stranglehold over the society that it governs and controls.
12 In spite of these reservations, anyone with an interest in Chinese foreign policy has
much to gain from the very valuable contribution made by Rising to the Challenge.
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